Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law

LARC @ Cardozo Law
Articles

2007

A Comment on Professor Buell’s Paper
Charles M. Yablon
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, yablon@yu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Charles M. Yablon, A Comment on Professor Buell’s Paper, 28 Cardozo Law Review 1653 (2007).
Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/217

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an
authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For more information, please contact christine.george@yu.edu, carissa.vogel@yu.edu.

Faculty

A COMMENT ON PROFESSOR BUELL’S PAPER
Charles Yablon*
Let me start by saying how much I enjoyed reading Professor
Buell’s article.1 It provoked the same reaction I get with many other
pieces I find powerful and thought provoking. It caused me to ask:
“Why don’t I agree with this piece?” A lot of what Professor Buell says
seems to me cogent, clear, and eminently correct, but at other times it
strikes me as, if not wrong, at least difficult to fully endorse. My
problem is that I am not entirely clear how strong a claim Professor
Buell is making with regard to his “badges of fraud.” He could be
saying that these “badges of fraud” are simply a way of explicating the
complex process of exercising prosecutorial discretion, and that these
“badges of fraud” are just one important factor that prosecutors analyze
in their multi-faceted decision as to whether or not to prosecute any
given fraud claim. If Professor Buell is only making this relatively
modest assertion, he and I have little to disagree over.
But it seems to me that Professor Buell frequently makes a much
stronger assertion, that the “badges of fraud” represent either a
necessary or a sufficient condition for the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion to bring a criminal fraud claim. Either of these claims strikes
me as problematic. It clearly cannot be a sufficient condition just to see
one of these badges of fraud in an investigation. Take concealment.
Obviously there is lots of concealment by corporate managers that does
not give rise to actionable fraud. CEOs can conceal adulterous affairs.
They can conceal deals that have not quite reached fruition. There is, in
short, a lot of information which they might be subjectively
surreptitious about, maybe even subjectively feel quite guilty about, and
which shareholders would find extremely interesting, but we would not
say that every instance of such concealment, surreptitious conduct or
subjective guilt, without more, constitutes actionable criminal fraud.
To say that the badges of fraud represent a necessary condition for
any criminal fraud prosecution also raises difficulties. Professor Buell
himself alluded to the major such problem when he observed that, as a
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matter of actual practice, when the fraud is of a well-established variety,
the courts will frequently presume mens rea or similar cognitive badges
of fraud.
So it would seem that Professor Buell’s badges of fraud are neither
a necessary nor a sufficient condition, but maybe at most, a necessary
condition for a criminal fraud prosecution when the fraud is of a novel
or unusual type. That may well be Professor Buell’s thesis. But note
that, if so, it comes close to being simply an assertion about one factor
in a multi-factor test. It says that when other factors favoring a criminal
fraud prosecution are weak, the presence of “badges of fraud” may well
be the deciding factor in favor of prosecution. As a descriptive account
of how prosecutors think about these matters, Professor Buell is very
likely correct and surely has more insight into these matters than I can
claim. But Professor Buell is making not just a descriptive but a
normative claim about these badges of fraud. He is saying that these
factors not only are, but should be, the deciding factor in at least some
important category of criminal fraud prosecutions.
As to this normative argument that badges of fraud should be, in
effect, the test for determining whether or not to bring a novel or
unusual fraud claim, I must confess that I have my doubts. It seems to
me there is enough flexibility in the fraud rules already, particularly
given the open texture of the very concept of materiality, and the
flexibility created by the fact that not only false statements, but
omissions are actionable, that adding an additional potentially
dispositive requirement of “badges of fraud” might well result in either
over or under prosecution of corporate fraud cases.
For an example of under-inclusion, take a quintessential case like
Enron. It is not inconceivable that, had the Enron management been a
little more careful and a little better advised, they might have shown no
badges of fraud whatsoever. They could have set up their Special
Purpose Entities perfectly and conformed with every single bit of
GAAP, showing no surreptitious behavior or evidence of subjective
guilt. Yet given the flexibility of the concept of materiality under the
federal securities laws, I believe they could still have been properly
prosecuted for failing to fully disclose the underlying economic reality
of those deals.
Finally, I think that the badges of fraud concept is a powerful idea
that will often work well in considering whether CEOs and other top
corporate executives should be prosecuted for fraud, but there are two
other important categories of potential defendants for whom the concept
is less useful. One is criminal wrongdoing by people at the middle or
low level of the corporate hierarchy, rather than by CEOs or other top
management. That is, you may have criminal activity that was not run
from the top of the hierarchy, but passively tolerated by that hierarchy,
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with various levels of knowledge. It seems to me that the badges of
fraud concept may not be the most useful way of framing the
prosecutorial decision in that context.
The other important category is the criminal prosecution of
corporate entities. It seems to me that the function of criminal law with
regard to corporate entities is quite different than that for human beings
and that the badges of fraud concept is less helpful in dealing with nonhuman defendants. Rather, the focus of prosecutorial discretion in such
cases should be on prospects of general deterrence, as well as avoiding
unnecessary injury to relatively innocent third parties like employees
and public shareholders. Given these concerns, the prosecutor’s choice
between criminal prosecution and civil penalties may be quite different
with regard to corporations than it is with CEOs, who may be fully
indemnified and have much shorter time horizons than investor or
employee groups.

